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IN EXECUTORY CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY,
SHOULD THE RISK OF LOSS BE UPON THE VENDEE FROM
THE TIME OF THE AGREEMENT?
"His (Lord Eldon's) opinion that the risk of loss by accidental
injury to or destruction of the property is upon the buyer from
the time of the bargain has been followed generally in this coun-
try as well as in England."'
It is true that in most of the fifty-four cases cited by Professor
Ames in support of this rule substantially this statement is made,
and the case of Paine v. Meller is quoted again and again as
having been the first to establish it; but it is equally true that in
very few of these cases were the facts such as to require a broad
and unqualified application of the rule.2 Because few courts have
really applied the doctrine to its fullest extent, and because there
is some authority and more reason against it, it has seemed worth
while to examine the authorities and the arguments pro and con,
in order to discover if some qualification should not be made.
Classified according to the extent to which they really, as
decisions, support the statement first quoted, the fifty-four cases
' Ames, Cases in Equity Jurisdiction, Vol. 1, p. 228, note 1.
2 6 Vesey, 349.
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cited by Professor Ames fall into several distinct groups, as
follows:
I. Cases where the vendee had gone into possession under
the agreement, and where, for anything that appears, he might
have had specific performance at any time by tendering the price;
that is, the loss did not occur before the date fixed by the con-
tract for conveyance.3 In these fourteen cases it was not neces-
sary for the court to apply the rule without restriction. The
words of Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Columbian Co. v.
Lawrence are worthy of notice in this connection: "The de-
struction of the property is a real loss to the person in possession
who claims under an executory contract. * * * No time for per-
formance is fixed."
II. Cases where the vendee could, for anything that appears,
have had specific performance upon tender of payment before
the day of the loss, although he was not in possession.
4
III. Miscellaneous cases, where the loss fell on the vendor,
or where the sale was one of personalty, or where the damage
resulted from the act of the vendee so that the rule, though
quoted, was not necessary to the decision of the court.5 Out of
the fifty-four cases cited as in general accord with this proposi-
tion, therefore, we have forty-one in which it was not necessary
3 Colunbian Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Pet., 25; Willis v. Wozencraft, 22 Cal.,
607; Stevenson v. Loehr, 57 Ill., 5C9; Cottinghanz v. Firemer's Co., 90 Ky.,
439; Walker v. Owen, 79 Mo., 563; Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin, 40
N. J., 568; Aetna Fire Ins. Co. v. Tyler, 16 Wend., 385; Rood b. N. Y. &
Erie Co., 18 Barb., 80; Falls v. Carpenter, 1 Dev. & B. Eq., 237; Ins. Co. v.
Updegraff, 21 Pa., 513; Morgan v. Scott, 26 Pa., 50; Miller v. Zufall, 113
Pa., 317; Imp. Co. v. Dunham, 117 Pa., 460; Brakhage v. Tracy, 13 S. Dak.,
343.
4Acland v. Cuining, 2 Midd., 28; Robertson.v.-Skelton, 12 Beav., 260;
Poole v. Adams, 33 L. J. Ch., 639; Coles v. Bristowe, 6 Eq., 149; Skinner
& Sons' Co. v. Houghton, 92 Md., 68; Gates v. Smnith, 4 Edw. Ch., 702;
McKechnie v. Sterling, 48 Barb., 330; Elliot v. Ashland.Co, 117 Pa., 548.
5 Harford v. Purrier, 1 Madd., 532"; Ex parte Minor, 11 Ves., 559;
Twigg v. Fifield, 13 Ves., 517; Rawlins v. Bur qis, 2 V. & B., 382; Para-
more v. Greenslade, 1 Sm. & G., 541; Revell v. Hussey, 2 Ba. & Be.,280;
Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall., 654; Mackey v. Bowles, 98 Ga., 730; Phinizy
v. Guernsey, 111 Ga., 346; Gammon v. Blaisdell, 45 Kan., 221; Durrett v.
Simpson, 3 Monr, 51Z; Calhoon v. Belden, 3 Bush., 674; Tufts v. Wynne,
45 Mo. Ap., 42; Clinton v. Hope Ins. Co., 45 N. Y., 454; Gilbert v. Port,
28 Oh. St., 276; Richter v. Selin, 8 S. & R., 425; Demmy's Ap., 43 Pa., 155;
Huguenin v. Courtenay, 21 S. Ca., 403; Christian v. Cabell, 22 Grat., 82.
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for the court, to accept it unqualifiedly for the purposes of the
decision.
IV. Cases which, hold explicitly that a loss occurring after the
bargain, but before the date set for conveyance has arrived, and
so before the vendee, has any right to possession or to specific per-
formance, falls on the vendee." Here are thirteen cases, in eight
jurisdictions, which can fairly be said to support the rule literally
as above stated. Of these jurisdictions, New York furnishes at
least as much authority for the opposite side, as will be shown
later. Now in these thirteen cases, the courts do not thrash out
the question on its merits, but treat it as settled on the authority
of Paine v. Meller, decided by Lord Eldon in 1801. An exam-
ination of this case ought to show whether or not it was really an
authority for these thirteen decisions.
At the time of the loss, in Paine v. Meller, the time set for
the conveyance had passed, the vendor was able to make good
title, and the vendee could have had specific performance at any
time. It would seem, indeed, that Lord Eldon was not oblivious
to these facts, and that he placed considerable weight upon them
is shown by the following words, which should be considered in
view of the fact that the bargain was entered into on September
first: "If the agent on behalf of this purchaser did accept this
title previously to the destruction of the premises, the vendors
are in the situation in which they would have been if the title
and the conveyance were ready at Michaelmas, 1796, but by the
default of the vendee were not executed, but the title was ac-
cepted, and the premises were burnt down on the quarter day."
Lord Eldon, it will be observed, is really stating two conditions
precedent to the vesting of the risk of loss in the buyer.
I. That the vendor be able to make good title. This condition
is, of course, universally recognized, because without its fulfill-
ment specific performance would be impossible.1
II. That, if a date for conveyance has been set, it must have
arrived before the loss occurs, because, without its fulfillment,
6 Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q. B. Div., 380; Davidson v. Hawkeye Ins.
Co., 71 Iowa, 532; Kuhn v. Freeman, 15 Kan., 423; Johnston v. Jones, 12
B. Monr., 326; Martin v. Carver, 1 S. W. R., 199; Marks v. Tichenor, 85
Ky., 536; Brewer v. Herbert, 30 Md., 301; Snyder v. Snyder, 51 Mo., 175;
Mott v. Coddington, 1 Abb. Pr. n. s. 290; Dunn c. Yakish, 10 Okl., 388;
Robb v. Mann., 11 Pa., 300; Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa., 200; Milville Co. v.
Wilgus, 88 Pa., 107.
7 Christian v. Cabell, 22 Grat., 82; Mac.key v. Bowles, 98 Ga., 730.
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the vendee would not be in a position to enforce specific per-
formance on the day of the loss.
The next question is, is there any other authority for the adop-
tion of this second rule, which imposes so important a limitation
on the rule stated in the beginning? Disregarding those cases
which hold absolutely that loss follows the legal title," we find
three decisions which place upon the vendor the loss occurring
before the time set for conveyance.9 Of these, Smith v. McClus-
key and Wicks v. Bowman, being both New York cases, should
outweigh Mott v. Coddington, the New York case cited
above.6 In Wicks v. Bowman, Chief Justice Daly places his
decision squarely on the following ground: "The doctrine that a
vendee is to be treated, in certain cases, as the owner, is founded
in the application of the equitable maxim, that what ought to be
done is considered, in equity, as done; a maxim that does not
apply where the contemporaneous acts-the payment of the pur-
chase money and the delivery of the deed-were to take place on
a day subsequent to the time when the building was destroyed by
fire."
In the last analysis, therefore, the authority in favor of the rule
first stated is by no means overwhelming, and we have some well
considered decisions in favor of qualification. It is" also apparent
that many of the courts which adopt the former view have based
it upon a misinterpretation of Paine v. Meller.
In closing, a brief statement of the arguments in favor of quali-
fication should be made. To maintain an action for the breach of
. contract in a court of law, it is now usually necessary for the
plaintiff to allege substantial performance, or tender of perform-
ance, of his own obligation. This doctrine is equitable in its
origin. No one can deny that the real meaning of the vendor's
promise, when he agrees to convey land, as understood by both
parties, is, that he will convey the land substantially in its then
condition. If a court of equity now forces the vendee to perform
without getting what he was promised, it will have to justify its
decision on some other ground than that of contract. The ground
usually stated is, that the vendee, having the benefits of owner-
ship, should bear the burdens. Let us see just what these bene-
8 Thoinpson v. Gould, 20 Pick., 134; Wilson v. Clark, 60 N. H., 352;
Listman v. Hickey, 65 Hun., 8; Powell v. Dayton Co., 12 Ore., 488.
9 Gould v. Murch, 70 Me., 288; Wicks v. Bowman, 5 Daly, 225; Smith
v. McCluskey, 45 Barb., 610.
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fits are, before the time has arrived when he can compel specific
performance. First, he is not entitled to possession, except by
special contract, and then he usually pays an extra consideration,
and becomes virtually a tenant.10 The vendor or his heir, there-
fore, is entitled to the rents and profits."
Second, he is neither in the position of a mortgagor or of a
cestui que trust, though many cases infer that he is, and on that
basis decide that he ought to bear the loss. The vendor has a
beneficial interest, namely, the right to the rents and profits, which
the trustee and the mortgagee, generally speaking, have not, and,
conversely, the vendee has not the beneficial interest which the
cestui que trust and the mortgagor have. In the absence of re-
cording acts, the vendee is at the mercy of the bona fide purchaser
for value and without notice, while the mortgagor at least, in the
American form of mortgage, is not. It is a strange misuse of
language to call one who can neither have the use of certain
premises in the present, nor be certain of having it in the future,
the beneficial owner of those premises.
It is therefore suggested that the rule stated in the beginning
ought to be amended as follows:
"The risk of loss by accidental injury to or destruction of the
property is upon the buyer from the moment that the latter has
it in his power to demand and get specific performance of the
contract."
CUSTOM AS AN APPARENT EXCUSE FOR NEGLIGENCE.
In the recent case of Korab v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 143
N. W., 876 (Iowa), it was held not error to refuse an instruction
to the effect .that where the undisputed evidence showed that rail-
roads at the time of the accident used both blocked and unblocked
frogs, and that it was questionable which was the safer for the
business of the roads, then the use of the unblocked frog was not
negligence.
This is a question upon which there is much difference of opin-
ion in the courts. Perhaps it will be helpful at the outset of the
discussion to ascertain just what negligence consists of.
The best definition of negligence is that of Judge Cooley,' who
10 Clinton v. Hope Ins. Co., 45 N. Y., 454.
13 Lumsden v. Fraser, 12 Simons, 263; Cyc., Vol. 39, p. 1629, pp. c.,
and cases cited.
I Cooley on Torts, 3d. Ed., Vol. 2, p. 1324.
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states that negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection
of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution,
or vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury." This has been widely adopted, 2 and
it has been generally held that the question whether a given state
of facts falls within this definition is a question of fact for the
jury and if there is any evidence upon which the jury might find
for the plaintiff, the question of negligence must be submitted to
them.3
So if the evidence is conflicting the jury must decide whether
negligence is present or not.4 Since, therefore negligence is de-
termined, to put it shortly, by the measure of due care, that care
is a fact to be weighed by the jury in each case. 5
It is conceded as a general rule that evidence that an instru-
mentality was or was not in common use is competent as tending
to show whether or not the defendant was in the exercise of due
care.6 This seems reasonable and fair, since it is evidence of what
others as a class do in similar businesses, which are presumably
conducted in a normal and cautious manner. However, it is held
in many jurisdictions that evidence of a custom cannot ever be
regarded as conclusively establishing lack of negligence.7 This
holding, we respectfully submit, states the correct rule.
2 Barret v. So. Pac. R. Co., 91 Cal., 296; Fisher v. New Bcrn, 140 N. C.,
506; Black v. Virginia Portland Cement Co., 104 Va., 450.
3 Chicago R. Co. v. Maloney, 99 Ill., 623; Powers v. Pere Marquette
R. Co., 143 Mich., 379; Baulec v. New York Central R. Co., 59 N. Y., 356.
4Price v. St. Louis, 75 Ark., 479; Central Pass R. Co. v. Chattanooga,
17 Ky. Law Rep., 5; McIntyre v. Detroit Safe Co., 129 Mich., 385; Swift
v. Staten Island R. Co., 123 N. Y., 645.
5 Littlefield v. Biddeford, 29 Me., 310; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. State,
144 U. S., 408; Augusta v. Killian, 79 Ga., 234.
GLabbatt on Master and Servant, Vol. I, par. 44; Wabash R. Co. v.
McDaniels, 107 U. S., 454; Meyers v. Hudson Irolt Co., 150 Mass., 130;
Austin v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co, 93 Iowa, 236; Pennsylvania Co. v.
Hankey, 93 Ill., 580.
7 Cass v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 14 Allen. (Mass.), 448; Derosia v.
Winona R. Co., 18 Minn., 133; Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels, supra; Mar-
tin v. California C. R. Co., 94 Cal., 326; McCormick Harvesting Co. v.
Burandt, 136 Ill., 170; but see Camp Point Mfg. Co. v. Ballow, 71 Ill., 417;
Hosic v. Chicago; R..I. & P. R. Co., 75 Iowa, 683; Sawyer v. Arnold Shoe
Co., 90 Me., 369; Craver v. Christian, 36 Minn., 413; Reichla v. Gruens-
felder, 52 Mo. App., 43; Lowrimnore v. Paliver Mfg. Co., 60 S. C., 153; Sin-
cere v. Union Compress & Warehouse Co., 40 S. W., 326.
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As said by Willes, J., in a leading English case, "no usage could
establish that what in fact is unnecessarily dangerous was in law
reasonably safe against those toward whom there was a duty to
be reasonably careful"8 The custom relied on may, in truth, be a
negligent one. Shall one be heard to say that because others have
been negligent he may be so too, and not under a liability, merely
because he has followed the flock? Such a holding would seem a
clear invasion of the province of the jury to pass upon questions
of fact.Now if the rule contended for be correct, it must apply to the
case in hand. If one custom is not conclusive as to negligence, it
does not alter matters that there are two, for both may be such
courses of proceeding as to be negligent. Therefore the case
under consideration is not distinguishable in principle from those
cited supra in note 7.
Nevertheless, plain as this may seem, the numerical weight of
authority takes the contrary view; is opposed to the case under
discussion and holds that when one has followed such a custom
he is, as a matter of law, not chargeable with negligence.
Thus the Nebraska court under a state of facts exactly similar
to the case under discussion held the defendant railroad company
freed from negligence as a matter of law, and said "that it was
not a case analogous to that of supplying defective machinery or
of omitting to use a device generally approved but a mere error
of judgment.10 Why it is not analogous we fail to see. Half the
railroads in the country may use instrumentalities so defective
that they are chargeable with negligence, yet that would constitute
a custom and be using a generally approved device. Also we are
of opinion that there may be an error in judgment so gross as to
render one liable.
In Pennsylvania an extreme doctrine exists. There it has been
held that reasonably safe appliances mean safe according to the
usage of the business and that this must establish the standard of
care. The court has said that no jury can say that the ordinary
way of doing things is a negligent way. We may well ask what
8 Inderman, v. Dames, L. R. 1 C. P., 274.
9 Kehler v. Schwenk, 144 Pa. St., 348; Bohn v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co., 106 Mo., 429; King v. Ford River Lumber C.o, 93 Mich., 172; Davis v.
Augusta Factory Co., 92 Ga., 712; Baylor v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.,
40 N. J. L., 410; Washington Asphalt Co. v. Mackey, 15 App. D. C., 410;
Saffenfield v. Main St. & Agri. Park R. Co., 91 Cal., 48.
10 O'Neill v. C. R. 1. & P. R. Co., 66 Neb., 638.
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is a jury for but to determine such matters? The standard of
care must vary with varying circumstances. Some one must apply
the test of negligence to the facts and no rule of law can be so
framed to cover every possible contingency so that the jury may
be relieved from their duty of determining the question of negli-
gence involved.
This same court, in a somewhat later case than the one noticed,"
held, where a city was sued for damages, claimed for a fall into
an areaway, which protruded into the street, that "no usage could
justify an encroachment on a public highway," and held evidence
of custom inadmissable on the question of negligence.
12
But the court remarked, in the course of the opinion, that the
evidence offered of the custom of having these areaways did not
show that the other areaways were exactly similar to the one in
question, in that they did not protrude into the street. It seems
doubtful whether the cases are reconcilable. The doctrine of the
earlier case has been re-affirmed in so far as it applies to cases
in which the public are not directly concerned at least.'
3
The New York court, in passing upon a similar question, stated
"that if the doctrine of the majority were not adopted someone
could always be found to testify that there was a better appliance
than the one used and that, therefore, the defendant would always
be liable.' 4 This conclusion seems erroneous, since in order to.
avoid being negligent one does not have to use the best appliances,
but only proper ones,' 5 and it does not follow that he will be liable
simply because there may be a better appliance in existence than
the one he uses.
A more formidable objection is advanced in Michigan,'
6 namely,
that a jury verdict in a case like the principal one would be no
protection to the defendant, for a verdict makes no precedent
and another jury on precisely the same state of facts may reach
the opposite conclusion. So if there were a later suit against the
defendant in which he was attacked for rejecting the same ap-
pliance which he had just been held liable for adopting there
might be a finding against him in both instances.
11 Titus v. Bradford B. K. R. Co., 136 Pa. St., 618; Reese v. Hershey,
163 Pa. St., 253.
12 McNerney v. Reading, 150 Pa. St., 611.
13 Reese v. Hershey, supra.
14 ffarley v. Buffal. Car Mfg. Co., 142 N. Y., 31.
15 Titus v. Bradford, supra.
16 McGinnis v. Canada So. Bridge Co., 49 Mich., 472.
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To this the obvious answer is that the cause of such a result
lies in a defect of our jury system and not in the law, that such
an objection is applicable to any succession of civil suits, and that
there is no more reason to establish an artificial standard of care
in the given case than in any other.
The Arkansas authorities are of the opinion that they can
conceive of no other way of determining what ordinary care is
than by ascertaining vhat men of prudence do in like circum-
stances.' 7 This ignores the possibility of expert testimony from
well-informed railroad men and would be a rather negligible ob-
jection.
It remains to be noticed that the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that such an instruction as that asked for in the
principal case should have been given and -it was even decided that
the defendant was entitled to a pre-emptory instruction in his
favor,'" but in that case it appeared that the evidence tended
slightly to show that the unblocked frog which was used was bet-
ter than the blocked one under the particular circumstances.
On the whole we adhere to the rule of the principal case. It is
common knowledge that many customs widely adopted are pro-
ductive of unfortunate results. Allowing one to justify himself
for his own carelessness by settingup the carelessness of others
is to our mind contrary to reason and justice.
PUBLIC USE IN EMINENT DOMAIN.
Eminent domain is the right of a sovereignty to take private
property for public use.' The holdings of the courts as to what
constitutes a public use resolve themselves into two classes :2 one,
adhering to a strict construction, holding that a use or right of
use on the part of the public is an essential element ;3 the other,
the more liberal view, holding that great public utility or benefit
17 Kansas T. Coal Co. v. Brownlie, 60 Ark., 582.
18 Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Seley, 152 U. S., 145.
'Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N. J. Law, (1 Zab.) 714, 728; Groff v. Bird-in-
Hand Turnpike Co., 128 Pa. St., 621, 5 L. R. A., 661.
2 10 Am. & Eng. Ency., 1662; Lewis on Emineit Domain (3d Ed.),
sec. 257.
3 Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me., 351; Board of Health v. Van Hoesan, 87
-Mich., 533; Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N. J. Eq., 694; Var-
ner v. Martin, 21 W. Va., 534.
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may constitute a public use.4  Both of these views are open to
criticism. Under the strict view it is impossible to deyelop the
natural resources of the state except by public corporafions.
Unless manufacturing concerns can exercise the right of flowage,
the water power of the smaller streams cannot be utilized.5 Unless
land can be condemned for irrigation purposes large districts must
remain non-productive.6  The second view, holding that public
use is co-extensive with public welfare seems too broad. The
difficulty in adopting this rule is brought out by Chief Justice
Cooley in the case of Ryerson v. Brown7 where he said, in re-
pudiating the rule, that every lawful business in a sense confers 'a
public benefit. Under this rule the courts have no fixed principle
to guide them, but must use their own discretion in each individual
case in deciding whether the benefit to the public is sufficient to
justify the exercise of eminent domain.
The Connecticut Supreme Court in the recent case of The
Connecticut College for Women v. Calvert9 defines public use as
a use governmental in hts nature, and one in which the public has
or can acquire a common right on equal terms to the use or
benefit of the property taken, except only that the use or right of
use by the public may be dispensed with when a public benefit
results which cannot otherwise be realized, and which continues
to exist although the public has no use or benefit of th property
taken. This rule seems to cover practically all of the cases in
which eminent domain has been granted, and is free from the
objections to the other rules given. The exception permitting
the taking when a public benefit results which cannot otherwise
be realized, permits the utilization of natural resources and justi-
40lmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn., 532; Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray
(Mass.), 417; Matter of Townsend, 39 N. Y., 171; by'public use is meant
for the use of many or where the public is interested, Seeley v. Sebastian,
4 Oregon, 25.
5 Camp v. Olmstead, supra; Talbot v. Hudson, supra.
6 Rialto Irrigation Dist. v. Brandon, 103 Cal., 384; Ellinghouse vc. Tay-
lor, 19 Mont., 462; Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 Nev., 261; Umalina Jrrigation
Co. v. Barnhart, 22 Oregon, 389.
7 35 Mich., 332.
8 The existence of a public use so largely 'depends upon the peculiar
circumstances and conditions surrounding the locality in which thre case
arises, that no definite rule can be laid down in regard to it. Clark v.
Nash, 198 U. S., 361, followed in Baillie v. Larson, 138 Fed., 177.
9 88 Atl., 633.
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fies the earlier Connecticut cases granting the right of flowage.10
It sufficiently safeguards private property rights by prohibiting
taking for public use generally, and only permitting the taking
when the benefit to the public could not otherwise be realized or
where the public has a right to the use or benefit.
Although all the earlier Connecticut decisions, allowing the
exercise of eminent domain can be brought under this rule-, the
rule followed in those cases was the broad definition of a public
use as a public benefit or as a great public utility." The court
has in this case, therefore, narrowed the former doctrine.
The question before the court in this case was whether a legis-
lative grant of the right to exercise eminent domain to the Con-
necticut College for Women, owned and controlled by a private
corporation, was constitutional. The court held, Wheeler, J. dis-
senting, that such a grant wa unconstitutional, since the charter
of the college, stating that its purpose was the higher education
of women, did not state that the public generally had the right to
enjoy the benefits of the college. As stated in the opinion, the
question whether universities and colleges when owned and con-
trolled by private corporations administer a public use so as to
justify a grant of eminent domain to them has apparently never
been before the courts.
Under the broad definition of a public use such a grant would
seem justifiable. Such was evidently the opinion of Governor
Baldwin, former Chief justice, when he signed the bill. Under
the definition given by the court the holding is clearly sound.
The charter of the college 12 by not stating that the public have a
common right upon equal terms, leaves it to the corporation to
fix any limitations upon admittance it may see fit. Nor does it
appear that the existence of the right of eminent domain is essen-
tial to the life of the college.
REVOCATION OF FRANCHISE BY MUNICIPALITY.
By a division of five to four the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of City of Owensboro v. Cumberland Tele-
phone & Telegraph Company' recently affirmed the doctrine of
10 Olmstead v. Camp, supra; Austin v. Todd, 34 Conn., 78.
11 Bradley v. Railroad Co., 21 Conn., 294; Olmstead v. Camp, supra;
Austin v. Todd, supra; Railroad Co. v. Oflfeld, 77 Conn., 417, 421.
12 16 Sp. L. Conn., 1911, p. 101.
133 Sup. Ct. Rep., 988.
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the Dartmouth College Case, holding that the grant by ordinance
to an incorporated telephone company, its successors and assigns,
of the right to occupy the streets and alleys of a city with its
poles and wires for the necessary conduct of a public telephone
business, is a grant of a property right in perpetuity, unless
limiied in duration by the grant itself, or as a consequence of
some limitation imposed by the general law of the state, or by
the corporate powers of the city making the grant; and that the
general authority given by a city charter to "make, publish, and
repeal all ordinances" of such character cannot be construed as a
reservation of the power to -evoke that grant. Quoting the opin-
ion of the court: "When that grant .was accepted and acted upon
by the grantee it became a contract between the city and the tele-
phone company which could not be revoked or repealed, unless
the power to repeal was clearly and unmistakably reserved. * * *
In the absence of an express provision in the contractual ordi-
nance, or an express delegation of power to revoke contracts
under such ordinances, we think no such extraordinary power is
to be implied. * * * That the right may be reserved to destroy
a contract may be conceded; but when such a right is claimed,
it must be clear and explicit."
Mr. Justice Day, the author of the minority opinion, contends
that legislative grants of municipal authority should be construed
most favorably to the public and against persons claiming there-
under, and that the same law which gave the city the right, ,yhich
otherwise would have rested with the legislature alone, of author-
izing the use of its streets for telephone purposes, in unmistak-
able terms made such authority subject to "the clearly stated and
definite limitation named," i. e., section 10 of the city charter
which provides that "the common council shall have control of
the finances and all property, * * * belonging to the city, and shall
have full power to make, publish, and repeal all ordinances for
the following purposes, viz:" sub-section 27, "to regulate the
streets, alleys, and sidewalks, and all r~pairs thereof." He relies
on the cases of Greenwood v. Union Freight R. Co.,2 Calder v.
Michigan,3 and Lake Roland Elev. R. Co. v. Baltimo're.4 None
of them are exactly in point. In the first case a general law of
the state made "every act of incorporation subject to amendment,
2 105 U. S., 13.
3218 U. S., 591.
4 77 Md., 352.
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alteration, or repeal, at the pleasure of the legislature"; in the
second, there was a similar provision in the State Constitution;
in the third, a statute passed to confirm a grant of a franchise by
a municipality contained a reservation to the municipality "of the
same power and control thereafter in reference to the enforce-
ment, amendment or repeal of" the ordinance as it had or would
have had in, respect to any ordinance passed under its general
powers. In each of these cases it was held that a repeal of the
franchise was not a violation of the constitutional prohibition of
impairment of contract obligations by state laws..
It is generally conceded that an ordinance of a municipality,
surrendering a part of its powers to a corporation to secure and
encourage works of improvement, which requires the outlay of
money and labor, to subserve the public interests of its citizens,
when accepted and acted upon, becomes a contract between the
city and the corporation which relied upon it, and the grantee
cannot be arbitrarily deprived of the rights thus secured. But
if the grant contains an unqualified condition that it may be re-
voked at the pleasure of the municipality, it is a bare license and
is revocable without cause at the will of the. city.5 It has also
been generally held, where the State Constitution or a statute pro-
vides a reservation of the right to amend, alter or repeal cor-
porate franchises granted under special or general laws, that this
reservation qualifies the grant; and a subsequent exercise of the
reserved power is not within the prohibition of the Federal Con-
stitution, as an act impairing the obligation of a contract, even
though the corporate charter contains no allusion to the reserva-
tion, which is deemed to be embodied in the charter." The cases
on which the minority bases its opinion are all in accord with this
doctrine. In all of these cases there was mention in the Constitu-
tion, statute, or charter, of the application of the reservation
specifically to corporate charters, but in the clause in the munici-
pal charter under consideration there was no reference to fran-
chises, simply a general grant of the power to repeal ordinances
made in execution of the delegated authority to legislate. Under
5 3 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., §1306.
6 West Wisconsin R. Co. v. Trempealeau, 35 Wis., 257; State v. Chi. &
N. W. Ry., 128 Wis., 449; Pennsylvania College Cases, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.),
190; Tomlinson v. Jessup, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.), 459; Railroad Co. v. Geor-
gia, 98 U. S., 359; Spring Valley & C. v. Schottler, 110 U. S., 347; Mo.
Pac. Ry. v. State, 216 U. S., 262.
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these circumstances we are led to follow the opinion of the court
and construe the mention in the city charter of the power to
repeal to be mere surplusage, especially in view of the fact that
the Dartmouth College Case was decided in the face of the rule
of law that the power to legislate necessarily comprehends full
power'to amend and repeal laws legislative in character.
7
The opinion of the court can also be supported on the further
ground that in exercising the reserved power, the legislature may
not deprive a corporation of property already acquired or the
proceeds of contracts previously made." A Pennsylvania case
considers the charter under such circumstances to be a quasi-
contract.9
7 Milan, etc. v. Husted, 3 Ohio State, 578, 581.
8 People v. O'Brien, 111 N. Y., 1; N. Y. C. & H. R. R. v. Williams,
199 N. Y., 108; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S., 700; Union Pacific v. Mason
City, etc., 199 U. S., 160.
9 Manheim Borough v. Manheim Water Co., 229 Pa., 177.
